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Abstract— The outstanding versatility of SRAM-based FPGAs 
make them the preferred choice for implementing complex 
customizable circuits. To increase the amount of logic available, 
manufacturers are using nanometric technologies to boost logic 
density and reduce prices. However, the use of nanometric scales 
also makes FPGAs particularly vulnerable to radiation-induced 
faults, especially because of the increasing amount of 
configuration memory cells that are necessary to define their 
functionality. 
This paper describes a framework for implementing circuits 
immune to radiation-induced faults, based on a customized 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) infrastructure and on a 
detection-and-fix controller. This controller is responsible for the 
detection of data incoherencies, location of the faulty module and 
restoration of the original configuration, without affecting the 
normal operation of the mission logic. 
A short survey of the most recent data published concerning 
the impact of radiation-induced faults in FPGAs is presented to 
support the assumptions underlying our proposed framework. A 
detailed explanation of the controller functionality is also 
provided, followed by an experimental case study. 
 
Index Terms— Fault location, Fault diagnosis, Fault tolerance, 
Fault mitigation, Reconfigurable systems 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE introduction of Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) 
technologies raised substantially the reliability of 
electronic systems, when compared with the previous use of 
discrete components. Hence, the use of fault tolerance 
techniques was confined only to specific applications 
requiring high levels of reliability or operating on harsh 
environments. Shrinking transistors’ size leads to a greater 
integration and to a per unit power reduction, enabling chips 
to grow both in size and complexity. But new nanometer 
scales also brought negative aspects, such as a high sensitivity 
to radiation-induced faults, which affects values stored in 
memory cells. Therefore, this kind of faults has a particular 
impact on the reliability of SRAM-based Field Programmable 
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Gate Arrays (FPGAs). The exponential growth in the number 
of memory cells needed for configuration makes these devices 
especially vulnerable to radiation-induced faults, such as 
Single Event Upsets (SEU) and Multi-Bit Upsets (MBU) 
[1-4]. Although these faults do not physically damage the 
chip, their effects are permanent, since the functionality of the 
circuits mapped into the device is permanently altered. 
Although anti-fuse technology FPGAs are less prone to 
SEUs due to the absence of configuration memory cells, 
SRAM-based FPGAs have been the preferred choice in space 
missions, like the MARS 2003 Lander and Rover vehicles. 
The reason was because their processing performance is 10 to 
100 times higher than the performance attained by anti-fuse 
technology FPGAs, and also due to their reconfigurable 
features. These features enable resource multiplexing, 
updating of algorithms during long space missions (avoiding 
mission obsolescence), and correction of design flaws while in 
orbit [5]. 
In non-reconfigurable technologies, such as ASICs, 
protection against SEUs is restricted to flip-flops, because 
logic paths between them are typically hard-wired. 
Nevertheless, Single Event Transients (SETs) ʊ a charge 
transient induced in a wire by the incidence of an heavy ion ʊ 
may be propagated to flip-flop inputs, where they have a high 
probability to be registered, causing soft-errors in the user 
data. Besides, if an SET strikes a clock line, double-clocking 
may occur, leading to an extemporaneous update that may 
affect part of or all the flip-flops driven by that line 
(depending on the charge value and on line attenuation). 
Further protection may only be achieved through full module 
redundancy. This is also a preferred choice to improve the 
reliability of highly critical applications based on FPGAs 
[4-7]. Due to their inherent configurability, FPGAs are 
especially suitable for the implementation of modular 
redundancy, since it does not require any architectural 
innovation and it is function-independent. However, and 
because these devices rely on memory cells to define logic 
paths, they are also susceptible to SEUs. Again, in this case, 
the only effective protection is full module redundancy [6]. 
In a discrete implementation of a Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) system, if a defect affects the 
functionality of a single module, reliability decreases, but the 
system will continue to work correctly. However, a second 
failure in one of the remaining modules will lead to a system 
failure. Ideally, when a module fails, it should be replaced to 
restore the initial redundancy, but this action may not be 
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possible immediately. In certain cases, like in space 
applications, it may even be impossible. In the case of FPGA-
-based systems, a significant improvement in reliability may 
be achieved without a significant rise in costs ʊ in the event 
of a module failure, the initial redundancy may be restored by 
reconfiguration of the affected module. No physical 
replacement is therefore necessary. 
This paper presents a set of rules for a new framework for 
implementing circuits immune to radiation-induced faults in 
FPGAs, based on its confinement, detection, location and 
mitigation. The proposed framework is built around a 
customised TMR implementation, associated to a fault 
detection-and-fix controller. This controller is responsible for: 
(i) detecting data incoherencies; 
(ii) locating the faulty redundant module; and 
(iii) restoring the original module configuration, fixing it 
without affecting the normal operation of the functional logic. 
This mechanism was implemented on a XC2V1500, a 
device that belongs to the Virtex-II FPGA family from Xilinx. 
Our proposed approach enables the confinement and detection 
of faulty modules, and the determination of when 
reconfiguration must be applied to restore proper system 
operation, before cumulative errors, induced over time, lead to 
its failure. A short survey of recent literature concerning the 
impact of radiation-induced faults on FPGAs and on FPGA 
based TMR implementations, is reviewed to support the 
options assumed during the implementation phase. A 
discussion concerning implementation issues, mainly related 
to design options and architectural features of the FPGA, 
which may prevent an efficient implementation of the 
proposed framework, are also presented. The work herein 
presented is part of a broader project, addressing the design of 
FPGA based self-healing circuits. Practical implementation 
aspects are also pointed out, and current and future research 
lines are presented in the concluding section. 
II. PREVIOUS OBSERVED RADIATION EFFECTS ON FPGAS 
The results of several radiation campaigns in SRAM-based 
FPGAs, carried out with the objective of understanding the 
effects of radiation-induced faults, were reported by several 
authors [2, 3, 7]. These authors observed that, in general, 
radiation changes the correct functionality of the circuits, an 
effect defined as a Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI). 
A classification of SEFIs according to the affected resources 
and their effects was proposed in [1-2]. 
Several fault injection approaches, proposed as alternatives 
to (expensive) radiation campaigns, may also be found in the 
literature. In these papers the effects of SEUs are emulated as 
bit-flips in the bitstream of the configuration memory of the 
FPGA, either through changes in the original configuration 
bitstream or at run-time, through dynamic reconfiguration 
[8, 9]. The greatest advantage of these methods is the higher 
controllability of the experiments, in contrast to the 
unpredictability of radiation injection, which enables a better 
diagnostic of the effects of each SEU. A combination of both 
techniques, not only to increase the controllability of the 
experiments, but also to verify the accuracy of the emulation 
fault injection techniques used, may be found in [4, 5, 10, 11]. 
Lately, several hardening techniques have been proposed to 
avoid SEU effects on the functional behavior of circuits. 
Correcting techniques based on dynamic reconfiguration, 
known as scrubbing, like those presented on [12-14], 
periodically read back the configuration memory to detect 
bit-flips caused by SEUs. If a bit-flip is detected, the affected 
frame is reconfigured and the system is reset. However, the 
same authors recognized some limitations to these techniques: 
a fault-free read-back of the configuration bitstream does not 
always guarantee that a SEU did not occur. As an example, 
SEUs or SETs affecting flip-flop states occur without 
upsetting the bitstream, but may severely disturb or even halt 
function operation. Another drawback is fault detection 
latency. Reading back the whole configuration memory may 
take from several milliseconds to a few hundred milliseconds, 
depending on the size of the FPGA and on the interface used 
to perform the read-back operation. By then, the fault may 
already have caused the irreversible malfunctioning of the 
whole system. In some cases, it may even be impossible to 
recover from this situation. 
Alternative techniques based on hardware redundancy were 
proposed without the aim of identifying and correcting the 
fault, but just to mask its existence. Through extensive TMR 
testing, several authors have shown that SEU-induced failures 
can be properly controlled for the Virtex family of FPGA 
devices [6, 7, 11, 15]. Fault tolerance is achieved using extra 
components to instantaneously mask the effect of a faulty 
component, meaning that no fault propagation will occur. 
Still, as no fault detection occurs, the faulty module is not 
replaced and therefore the initial redundancy (and reliability) 
is not restored. Consequently, over time, cumulative faults 
will increase the probability of a general system failure. 
The consideration of the results achieved during radiation 
campaigns concerning MBUs, due to single charged particles, 
is also important, since they may potentially affect multiple 
redundant modules and produce incorrect values. The effects 
produced by MBUs are intrinsically related to the architecture 
of the configuration memory. In Virtex families, configuration 
memory is divided into one bit wide vertical frames that span 
from the top to the bottom of the array. Each column of 
Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) comprises multiple 
frames, which combine internal CLB configuration and state 
information, with column routing and interconnection 
information. In [5] it is reported that MBUs in Virtex devices 
occurred all in the same configuration frame, while in the 
Virtex-II family, the percentage of MBUs that occurred in the 
same configuration frame decreases to 88%. However, no 
MBUs spanned the configuration data of separated resource 
columns [4]. No correlation was observed between MBUs and 
module granularity sizes, which indicates that even at very 
fine granularities, if the modules are placed far enough so as 
not to share routing networks, TMR is still a good option. 
These results also reveal important information about the 
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placement of the configurable memory cells inside the FPGA. 
This information is important to understand the fault induction 
mechanism due to radiation. 
In summary, the association between dynamic 
reconfiguration and TMR seems to be the most effective way 
to mitigate the effects of radiation (although extra care is 
required during the mapping of the circuits into the FPGA). 
The experimental results and conclusions reviewed above 
were taken into account when developing our proposed 
framework for the design and implementation of radiation 
immune FPGA-based circuits. 
III. FRAMEWORK RULES 
Effective protection of an FPGA-based circuit against 
radiation requires a TMR design. In addition, it has to 
incorporate an autonomous mitigation mechanism to avoid 
circuit failures due to the cumulative effects of SEUs. 
In a classic TMR implementation [16], the correct circuit 
output values are settled by voting elements that accept the 
outputs from three redundant sources and deliver the majority 
vote at their outputs. To ensure a consistent reliability index, 
voters have also to be replicated, in a scheme known as 
T-TMR [16]. T-TMR implementations mask any single fault 
emerging during circuit operation. Multiple faults may also be 
masked, providing that i) they affect only one of the redundant 
modules or voters, ii) if affecting different modules, they 
involve different signals and bitwise comparison is used. In 
these cases, faults are confined to the module or voter where 
they emerged, and are not visible from its outside.  
To fully prevent functional problems caused by 
configuration upsets, each signal should enter the FPGA in 
triplicate, using three input pins [15]. Otherwise, if a single 
input was connected to all three redundant modules, then a 
failure at the single input would cause the error to propagate 
through all the redundant modules, and thus the error would 
not be masked. 
This same principle applies to clock signals. Each of the 
triplicate circuit modules should receive its own clock. 
Otherwise, spurious signals induced by SETs on a single 
clock line may lead to an extemporaneous update of all the 
three-module registers and to the asynchronous output of 
possibly incorrect values. 
Output signals should also leave the FPGA in triplicate, 
with minority voters monitoring each output [15]. The three 
signals converge to a same node outside. When one output is 
different from the others, the correspondent pin is driven to 
high impedance. 
To avoid the effect of MBUs on the different modules [4], 
the three redundant functional modules should be placed in 
different columns of the FPGA. This means that the FPGA 
should be divided into four vertical areas: three for the 
functional circuit modules and a fourth area for placing the 
detection-and-fix controller. The interconnections between a 
module and its own Input/Output Blocks (IOBs) should not 
cross other modules’area. The overall implementation scheme 
proposed is illustrated in figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. Proposed framework overview. 
 
When one or more faults appear in one of the modules or 
voters, the T-TMR implementation confines the fault and 
masks its existence, avoiding its propagation to the rest of the 
circuit. However, the cumulative effects of several faults 
induced over time may suppress the effectiveness of the 
confinement and masking mechanism, allowing fault 
propagation. With the aim of detecting the emergence of faults 
a detection-and-fix controller is implemented in the fourth 
area defined on the FPGA logic space. A detailed overview of 
this controller structure is shown in figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Overview of the detection-and-fix controller structure. 
 
The detection-and-fix controller is responsible for detecting 
data incoherencies, locating the faulty module and restoring 
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the original configuration. This is done transparently, through 
partial reconfiguration of the affected functional module, 
without human intervention, since physical component 
replacement is not needed. As a result, a higher level of 
maintainability is achieved without implying the inoperability 
of the circuit. 
IV. FAULT DETECTION, LOCATION AND MITIGATION 
This last point implies not only the existence of redundancy 
but also of a mechanism able to detect the emergence of an 
induced fault. It is very hard to detect a fault in a T-TMR 
implementation using traditional online test strategies, since 
the redundancy of the circuit masks its effect. In our approach, 
the detection of the faulty modules is done via three scan 
chains that regularly capture the values at the outputs of the 
modules and voters. 
 
A Boundary-Scan (BS)-like register [17] is used to 
implement the scan chain, composed of simpler cells 
comprising only a capture / shift stage, as shown in figure 3. 
The absence of the latch stage means that no delay is 
introduced in the signal’s path by the scan chain. To avoid 
capturing undefined values, the scan chain is updated 
synchronously with the system clock (assuring that modules 
or voters outputs will be in a steady state when they are 
captured).  
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Fig. 3. Observe-only BS cell (comprising only the capture / shift stage). 
 
The scan chain control signals are generated by the 
detection-and-fix controller. This controller regularly updates 
the scan chains and shifts its contents, comparing the output 
values. Our framework uses three parallel scan chains, each 
covering a different module. This approach makes it easier for 
the controller to accurately diagnose which of the three 
module areas was affected by a fault, and to trigger its 
reconfiguration. More than one scan chain in parallel also has 
the additional advantage of decreasing fault detection latency, 
since the shifting time is divided by the number of parallel 
chains (enabling more frequent capture operations). 
The sequence of tasks carried out by the detection-and-fix 
controller is represented in the flowchart shown in figure 4. 
This sequence is continuously repeated in search of emerging 
faults (either in the controller or in the user modules). The 
serial bitstreams captured through the scan chains are shifted 
to the internal controller where they are compared, bit-by-bit. 
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Fig. 4. Detection-and-fix controller flowchart. 
 
If an incoherency is detected, the module or voter where it 
was found is probably faulty. Obviously, the controller and 
the scan chains may also be affected by SEUs. To ensure their 
correct operation, the controller is equally implemented using 
a T-TMR design and its modules and voter output signals are 
also covered by the scan chains, creating a self-verifiable 
circuit. The option of concentrating the controller in only one 
area, despite being implemented in T-TMR, was taken to 
reduce complexity and the number of occupied CLB columns. 
However, since it occupies fewer slices than those available in 
each column, a convenient separation between modules was 
implemented. 
The first bits of the scan chain belong to the outputs of the 
controller. If an incoherency is detected in those first bits, the 
controller will be fully reconfigured at once. This procedure 
guarantees that the controller is working properly. While not 
being a critical component (concerning the functionality of the 
system), a fault-free controller is mandatory to avoid the 
accumulation of errors and the subsequent system failure. 
If an incoherency is detected on an output of one of the 
modules or voters, the area where it is implemented will be 
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reconfigured after the last bit of the scan chains has been 
shifted. If several incoherencies are detected in the same 
module, the module is reconfigured after a parameterizable 
number of errors, even before reaching the last bit of the scan 
chains. A new capture operation is then performed and the 
verification process restarted.  
Of course, if an upset affects the values shifted through the 
scan chain, this will falsify fault diagnosis and consequently 
trigger an extemporaneous reconfiguration of one the 
modules. This operation, although unnecessary, will not affect 
the operation of the system. 
A more complicated situation takes place if the structural 
configuration of the scan chains is affected by a fault. In this 
case, several neighboring bits will be disturbed, falsely 
indicating that a general failure in one or more modules 
occurred. Additionally, it won’t be possible to locate the place 
where the faults emerged. Therefore, after the detection of a 
parameterizable number of errors, either in the controller or in 
the modules, the controller undertakes a full dynamic 
reconfiguration of the FPGA and completely restores the scan 
chains. 
The exact location of the faulty module or voter, enables 
the controller to activate the partial reconfiguration and 
restoration of the faulty module. An external memory stores 
the original partial configuration files concerning the four 
defined areas. Due to the volatility of the FPGA configuration 
memory, this external memory was already necessary to hold 
the FPGA configuration bitstream (to be uploaded during 
system power up). 
The inclusion of a fault detection mechanism improves the 
performance of the recovery procedure. In this case, scrubbing 
takes place only when necessary and on a well defined target. 
Bearing in mind the intervals between the occurrence of 
SEUs, even in space applications [12], this solution enables 
considerable power savings when compared with periodic 
“blind” full reconfiguration. 
SEUs that do not upset the bitstream, like those affecting 
flip-flop states that cannot be removed by reconfiguration, 
will also be detected. As mentioned before, this means that 
scrubbing by itself can not ensure fault-free operation, and 
that TMR is always needed to avoid fault propagation. 
However, due to the transient nature of upsets, the soft error 
will be recovered by the circuit when the affected flip-flop is 
again updated. 
V. CASE STUDY 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, a twenty 
four-bit counter was implemented in a XC2V1500-based 
prototyping board, according to the rules defined in our 
proposed framework. The detection-and-fix controller used a 
total of 254 slices, distributed across two of the 40 available 
CLB columns, representing an area overhead of 5%. Notice 
that this overhead is constant and independent of the size or 
the complexity of the circuits implemented on the FPGA. The 
remaining 38 columns were divided in three areas of 12 
columns each, leaving a total of 2304 slices available for the 
implementation of each user module. The extra two columns 
(remainder of the division of 38 by 3) were placed among the 
three areas of 12 columns, to reinforce protection against 
column-spanning MBUs. 
Each module area enables the implementation of circuits far 
more complex than the one used to validate the proposed 
solution. The incorporation of the scan chain implied an 
overhead of 3 slices per module output, necessary to capture 
the module output and the outputs of the corresponding 
majority and minority voter. The overhead is therefore 
dependent on the number of outputs of the user circuit and not 
on its complexity. In case of fault detection, the detection-and-
-fix controller initiates the partial reconfiguration of the 
affected area, by resolving the location address of the file to 
be configured. Our prototyping board uses SystemAce [18] 
from Xilinx to keep trace of the partial configuration files and 
to configure the FPGA. However, different kinds of interfaces 
may be used to provide the partial reconfiguration files, 
including remote sources. The partial reconfiguration files 
were generated using the Foundation tools from Xilinx.  
The dynamic reconfiguration of part or of the whole FPGA 
does not affect the operation of the functions whose 
functionality is not changed, even if they are active and if its 
placement area is covered by the reconfiguration procedure. In 
other words, the mitigation procedure is completely 
transparent.  
The maximum speed of operation achieved by the 
detection-and-fix controller was 200MHz. Since capture 
operations must be synchronous with the operation of the 
user’s circuit, this frequency also defines the maximum 
operating speed of the circuit. 
Several tests based on localized fault injection through 
partial reconfiguration proved the effectiveness of the 
proposed concept. In addition, a random fault injection 
procedure is under way to better simulate real working 
conditions. An FPGA configuration frame is picked out 
randomly and a bit flip is also randomly performed in one of 
its configuration bits. The FPGA is then partially reconfigured 
using the altered bitstream.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a framework for the confinement, 
detection and mitigation of radiation-induced faults in FPGAs, 
built around a customised TMR implementation. Several 
issues addressing the effectiveness of TMR to cope with 
radiation-induced faults were reviewed and discussed. Based 
on a compilation of experimental data reported by several 
authors, it was shown that T-TMR plus scrubbing is the most 
effective approach to mitigate radiation-induced faults in 
FPGAs and to extend the reliability of the implemented 
circuits. According to the same experimental data, several 
techniques were listed to improve the effectiveness of T-TMR 
implementations and a set of rules was proposed to get the 
most from a T-TMR implementation in terms of radiation-
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induced fault protection. A practical case-study enabled the 
quantification of the overhead of our proposed solution and 
the assessment of its effectiveness. Further work is being done 
to better evaluate the behavior of the circuit. 
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